The Long Tail

The best selling MP3 album of the year was free

Cool news: The best-selling MP3 album at Amazon in 2008 was Nine Inch Nails’ Ghosts I-IV, which was released free under a Creative Commons license.

The album made more than  $1.6 million in revenue for NIN in its first week, and hitting #1 on Billboard’s Electronic charts, Last.fm has the album ranked as the 4th-most-listened to album of the year, with over 5,222,525 scrobbles.

The Creative Commons blog notes:

NIN fans could have gone to any file sharing network to download the entire CC-BY-NC-SA album legally. Many did, and thousands will continue to do so. So why would fans bother buying files that were identical to the ones on the file sharing networks? One explanation is the convenience and ease of use of NIN and Amazon’s MP3 stores. But another is that fans understood that purchasing MP3s would directly support the music and career of a musician they liked.

The next time someone tries to convince you that releasing music under CC will cannibalize digital sales, remember that Ghosts I-IV broke that rule, and point them here.

[Hat tip to Phllip Torrone]

Guest post: Acting as a non-monetary economy

Adam Gurri wrote in with this excellent observation:

“When I think of something that is so abundant as to be available for free, I think of acting.

It's no secret that are are more actors in New York than there are productions to put them in.  Economics helps us understand the consequences of this to a certain extent; obviously a gigantic supply will result in lower wages per actor.  What interests me, however, is how this works in practice.  People think that a gigantic sector of a specific workforce could not possibly work for free, because they need to feed themselves and pay their bills, and so forth.

The thing about acting is that the labor force (actors) actually value the ability to do work in that field that they are willing to take on work for nothing and take on other jobs as a sort of cross-subsidy.  There is a sort of demand for employment in theater, which makes competition among actors so fierce as to actually drive down wages (at time of entry at least) to zero or near zero.

There is a parallel between this old story and what's going on in the content industries today, I think.  It used to be that professional economists, physicists, statisticians, historians, and software programmers were too busy doing their jobs to write about it for the general public.  As a result, newspaper and magazine writers--the majority of whom had no technical training or experience in these areas--none the less had a comparative advantage when it came to writing about these topics for broader audiences.

Today, the cost of writing on a blog that is out in the public to be seen by anyone interested in it is nearly nothing.  Russ Roberts can blog about economics, Google employees can blog about their projects, and so on.  The internet has made it possible for the content industries to look more like the acting industry: people giving away content for free because they enjoy it, while making money with a paying job.”

The miraculous power of scale

In this talk at UC Berkeley, Google's Sergey Brin confesses (at minute 1:27) that he thought Wikipedia couldn't work. Most people wouldn't contribute, he rightly assumed, and it would never reach critical mass.

He was in good company. In the classic "free rider" problem, you imagine an elementary school class with 20 students. If only two parents (10%) agree to volunteer to  help out as room parents and drive on field trips, the whole system breaks down: there aren't enough helpers and the two parents get angry at the others for not joining in. And that's exactly what Brin assumed would happen with Wikipedia.

But he was wrong, he says, because he--even he!--had underestimated the way scale can change the game. Sure, the experts say only 1% of Wikipedia's users actually contribute to making it better. Indeed, if you do the math, it's even worse than that: probably closer to 0.01% (today, Wikipedia has 75,000 active contributors out of 684 million visitors). But that 0.01% have created 10 million articles.

Most people don't contribute, just as Brin had feared, but it doesn't matter because the tiny fraction that do are a tiny fraction of an absolutely whopping number.

The lesson is that more is different. The Internet, by giving everybody access to a market of hundreds of millions of people, can work at participation rates that would be a disaster in the traditional world of non-zero marginal costs. YouTube works with just 0.1% of users uploading their own videos. Spammers can make a fortune with response rates of 0.00001%. (To give you some context, in my business of magazines, response rates of less than 2% on direct-mail subscription offers are considered a failure.)

This is the underlying logic of the Freemium business model, which uses the near-zero marginal cost of online distribution to reach the maximum possible audience, converting just a tiny fraction of them to paid users.

That's impossible for traditional products, which usually have non-zero marginal costs. You can't mail a brownie to everyone in the world on the hopes that a tiny fraction of them will come back for more. But on the Internet, it's not only possible, it's the smartest strategy.

That's why Freemium is so new (it was waiting for a zero-cost distribution method), and so counterintuitive to many people. Freemium doesn't work with the small numbers we're used to in daily life. Getting 5% of 100 people to pay for your software is no business, and in the traditional world it takes expensive marketing to reach more people than that.  But getting 5% of 100,000 people to pay for your software is a very nice business indeed, and online it costs virtually nothing to reach that many potential customers.

This is the point that everyone seems to miss: Free is not a business--it's zero-cost marketing for a business. And it works best at the largest scale: a small percentage of a big number is a big number.

Freemium math: what's the right conversion percentage?

In my original Wired article on Free, I described Freemium as the opposite of the traditional free sample: instead of giving away 1% of your product to sell 99%, you give away 99% of your product to sell `1%. The reason this makes sense is that for digital products, where the marginal cost is close to zero, the 99% cost you little and allow you to reach a huge market. So the 1% you convert, is 1% of a big number.

But that was just a hypothetical percentage split, to make a point. In the real world, what's the right balance? The answer varies from market to market, but some of the best data is in the games world.

In online free-to-play games, companies aim to structure their costs so they can break even if as little as 5-10% of the users pay. Anything above that is profit. Which is why these numbers from Nabeel Hyatt are so impressive:

• Club Penguin: 25% monthly uniques pay, $5/mo per paying user 
• Habbo: 10% monthly players pay, $10.30/mo per paying user 
• Runescape: 16.6% monthly uniques pay, $5/mo per paying user 
• Puzzle Pirates: 22% monthly players pay, $7.95/mo per paying user

As the blog notes, that compares very well to the 2% of the casual downloadable game market that pays, or a 3-5% that a lot of "penny gap" free trial web startups get. Estimates for the number of free Flickr users that convert to paid Flickr Pro range from 5-10%. Ning says 3% of its 500,000 social network creators pay for the premium version. And shareware software programs often see less than 0.5% of users paying up.

But others companies are able to do much better. Intuit, for instance, offers basic TurboTax Online free for federal taxes, but charges you for the state version. Company officials tell me 70% of users opt to pay for that version. That's a special case--practically everyone has to pay both federal and state taxes--but it's evidence that some very high conversion rates are possible in the Freemium model.

For the typical Web 2.0 company planning to use Freemium as its revenue model, my advice would be to set 5% as break-even, but balance the mix of free vs. paid features with the hopes of actually converting 10%. More than that, and you may be offering too little in your free version and thus not maximizing the reach that's possible with free. Less than that, and the costs of the freeloaders start to get significant, making it difficult to make money.

Finding a Freemium model that works for you

I was chatting last night with the CEO of one of the biggest software-as-a-service companies about how he could release a version of his product with a freemium model. The options that seemed best for him were these four:

1) Time limited (30 days free, then pay. This is the Salesforce model)

• Upside: Easy to do, low risk of cannibalization
• Downside: Many potential customers will be unwilling to commit enough to give the software a real test, since they know that if they don't pay they'll get no benefit after 30 days.

2) Feature limited (basic version free, more sophisticated version paid. This is the WordPress model)

• Upside: Best way to maximize reach. When customers convert to paid, they're doing it for the right reason (they understand the value of what they're paying for) and are likely to be more loyal and less price sensitive.
• Downside: Need to create two versions of the product. If you put too many features in the free version, not enough people will convert. If you put too few, not enough will use it long enough to convert.

3) Seat limited (can be used by up to some number of people for free, but more than that is paid. This is the Intuit QuickBooks model)

• Upside: Easy to implement. Easy to understand
• Downside: Might cannibalize the low end of the market.

4) Customer type limited (small and young companies get it free, bigger and older companies pay. This is the model used by Microsoft's BizSpark, where companies less than 3 years old and under $1 million in revenues get Microsoft's business software free.)

• Upside: Charges companies according to their ability to pay. Get fast-growing companies early.
• Downside: Complicated and hard-to-police verification process.

 

He hasn't decided which one to choose, but I like 3 and 4 best. They allow you to reach the largest potential market with the most useful product, and then convert the ones that are likely to be the best, most committed customers.

What recession means for free

I get asked this all the time these days, so before I crash after a speaking tour of Latin America (eight cities in four days!), here are my thoughts on what a recession will mean for free-based business models.

First, let's confine this to online, which is where the most interesting free models are. There are three main forms of "real" free: Ad-supported, "Freemium", and the Gift Economy. Here how I think each will be affected:

• Ad-supported: In the offline world, advertising is going to go down. Online, where it's easier to make the case for clear ROIs, I suspect advertising growth will continue to be positive, but will slow considerably. That means that many of the companies that were counting on a rising tide lifting their boats will be disappointed, and more than usual will go bust. Result: Negative
• Freemium: This should become the favored model, since it's connected to direct revenues. But companies that have only worked out the free part but not the premium part are going to have to figure out what they can add to their products to make them compelling enough to pay for. If they don't, they will find their investors' patience with them is very limited, and many will fold. Those that get the freemium balance right should be fine: free is a good price to have when people don't want to spend, and freemium models can work well when just 5% of users convert to premium, thanks to the near-zero marginal costs of serving the other 95%. Result: Modest positive
• Gift economy: This is driven primarily by people's "spare cycles" (AKA cognitive surplus) and rising unemployment means more spare cycles, sadly. Obviously people still need to pay the rent, so many of these shared contributions are really just advertisements for the contributor's skills. But other contributions will be idle hands finding work while they look for their next job. As a result I think you'll see a boom in creativity and sharing online as people take matters into their own hands. Today, if you're in-between jobs you can still be productive, and the reputational currency you earn may pay dividends in the form of a better job when the economy recovers. Result: Positive

Agree? Disagree? The comments are open.

FREE: the cocktail party version

When you're writing a book you need to have your elevator pitch down or "What's the book about?" will become the most dreaded four words you can hear (followed closely by "how's it going?").

Obviously the one-sentence version of the answer should be something close to the book's subtitle. But I haven't nailed that one down yet, so these days I just say "The economics of zero dollars and zero cents" and hope for the best. Some people glaze over and move on at that point, but for those who stop, intrigued, and ask me to explain, here's what I say:

We all know free--it's a trick that marketers use. But free is changing. When you think about it, there are two economies, one of atoms and one of bits. In the atoms economy, which is to say most of the stuff around us, things tend to get more expensive over time. But in the bits economy, which is the online world, things get cheaper. The atoms economy is inflationary, while the bits economy is deflationary.

The 20th Century was primarily an atoms economy. The 21st Century will be equally a bits economy. This book is about the differences between 20th Century free and 21st Century free--free moving from a marketing trick to a new economic model.

Anything free in the atoms economy must be paid for by something else, which is why so much traditional free feels like bait and switch--it's you paying, one way or another. But free in the bits economy can be really free, with money often taken out of the equation altogether. People are rightly suspicious of free in the atoms economy, and rightly trusting of free in the bits economy. Intuitively, they understand the difference between the two, and why free works so well online.

Today the online world is a country-sized economy built of free. The most interesting business models are in finding ways to make money around free. Sooner or later every company is going to have to figure out how to use free or compete with free, one way or another. My book is about how to do that.

Revised: the *four* kinds of FREE

A few weeks ago, I posted a diagram grouping free business models into three categories: cross-subsidies (eg, razor-and-blades), three-party markets (ads) and "freemium" (what economists call "versioning"; in this case most people get the free version). But as I was writing through that chapter, I realized that wasn't quite right.

The problem is that they're all cross-subsidies in one way or another:

• Paid products subsidizing free products: This is a staple of business, from the popcorn that subsidizes the loss-making movie to the expensive wine subsidizing the cheap meal in a restaurant. Free just takes that further
• Paying later subsidizing free now: The free cellphone with a two-year subscription contract is a classic example of the subsidy over time. It’s just shifting phone service from a point-of-sale revenue stream to an ongoing annuity. In this case, your future self is subsidizing your present self, with the hope that you won’t think about what you’ll be paying each year for the phone service but are instead dazzled by the free phone you get today.
• Paying people subsidizing free people: From the men who pay to get into nightclubs where the women get in free, to “kids get in free”, to progressive taxation where the wealthy pay more so the less wealthy pay less (and sometimes nothing), the notion that segmenting a market into groups by their willingness to pay is a conventional part of pricing theory. Free takes that to the extreme, extending to a class of consumers who will get the product of service for free. The hope is that the free consumers will attract or bring with them paying consumers (the aforementioned women or kids) or that some fraction of the free consumers will convert to paying consumers. When you walk through the amazing interiors of Las Vegas attractions, you get the view for free on the hope that some people will stop and gamble or shop.

So here I'll try another pass at getting this taxonomy right. The below has four kinds of free, with "gift economy" as the forth. That's still a form of cross subsidy, but it's so diffuse--threading from the reputation and attention economies back to money through some long process that's often impossible to quantify (like the way I'm going to financially benefit from this post)--that I don't include money in its diagram at all.

I've also modified the first to describe it as a direct cross-subsidy, which is to say that's typically you subsidizing yourself. The others are all other people subsidizing you, or you subsidizing other people. Finally, for economic purists out there, note that what I'm calling three-party markets (FREE 2) is what economists call "two-sided markets".

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The three kinds of FREE

One of the themes of the book is untangling the confusion over different kinds of free,which can range from a simple marketing gimmick to a radically new economic model. I've taken a quick pass at doing this visually, but we'll really have to pretty these diagrams up (perhaps with cute restroom-style figures for the various parties, rather than the Ps and Cs below?)

 

Here's the first, which dates back more than a century. It's the razors-and-blades model, as well as loss leaders of all sorts, from "free gift inside" to "free toaster for opening an account":

 

The second is the media business model, ranging from free-to-air broadcast radio and television to all ad-supported content online today:

 

 

The third is the new one, enabled by digital markets where the marginal cost of production and distribution is close to zero. This is the one that allows the "freemium" business model, where 90% of the users get the basic product for free and 10% chose to pay for a premium version. In economics this is called "versioning" and is a form of using price discrimination (where the main price is zero) to maximize both the consumer utility and the profit in a market. In this model, charging a small percentage of a large user base beats charging a large percentage of a small user base.  Obviously best for consumer products with potentially large appeal, it's the main Web 2.0 business model and can be found everywhere from Flickr and Flickr Pro to open source's "support included" commercial versions of Linux.

 

Any ideas on how to improve these or otherwise present them more clearly and engagingly in the book?

37 Signals: Charge for your products, Dummy!

[File under respected opposition] David Heinemeier Hansson, Jason Fried’s business partner at 37signals, begs to differ with the notion that Web companies shouldn't charge for their products. In a very entertaining speech (video below), he makes his case:

Forget using free to go mass and hope you'll become Facebook (or be bought by them). Instead, he says, focus on a small market and charge money. There are many ways to have a price in web software, he says, and he gives a few examples:

• Subscriptions (37Signals)
• Charge per use (Campaign Monitor email campaigns)
• Simply selling the software (Fogbugz)
• Flat fee for tiered service (Faxitnice)

He says that 37Signal's secret is not to target consumers (who don't like to pay) or big companies (that's a crowded space). Instead, they target the "Fortune 5 Million"--small companies with specific needs that are underserved (AKA the Long Tail).